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Management of Investor Acceptance in Wind Power Megaprojects: A Conceptual Perspective

INTRODUCTION
Governments throughout the world are seeking to generate more of their domestic power from renewable energy sources with the common goal of decreasing both carbon emissions and the dependence on limited fossil fuels. Power generation from wind energy is one of the most mature and fastestgrowing renewable energy technologies. Over the last 17 years, annual installations of wind power in Europe have continuously grown at an average rate of 15.6 % per year (EWEA, 2012a) . Currently, 94 GW wind power capacity is installed in the European Union (GWEC, 2012) . Most of the wind power installations in the European Union today range from small to mid-scale in size (the average onshore wind park size is about 10 MW [1] ), but the size of projects is steadily increasing and the trend is for large-scale wind parks (EWEA, 2012a; IEA Wind, 2010) . Particularly in the offshore wind power sector a number of very large-scale projects, so called "megaprojects" (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003) , are under construction so far, such as the British offshore wind park Greater Gabbard (500 MW) or the German offshore wind park Borkum West II (400 MW) [2] but this trend can also be witnessed onshore: the largest wind park in continental Europe is currently being built at Fântânele and Cogealac, Romania, with a capacity of 600 MW. The Romanian Black Sea coast (Constanţa county) offers very good wind conditions and will host several large-scale onshore wind parks in the 400-600 MWclass that are currently under construction or approved.
Megaprojects, in general, have several advantages such as synergies in construction and maintenance and better financing and purchasing conditions. But they are also characterized as "complex, politically-sensitive and involving a large number of partners" (van Marrewijk et al., 2008: 591) and often suffer from negative project performance, i.e. they overrun budgets and fall behind schedule (e.g. the case of the London Array offshore wind park, see further below). These issues have important implications for construction companies as well as for other stakeholders such as project initiators, developers and investors. Negative project performance can, for instance, be attributed to the underestimation of costs (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003) or the establishment of "misaligned or underdeveloped governance arrangements" (Sanderson, 2012) . Research shows that cost estimation and forecasting is more prone to psychological biases (e.g. optimism) and politics (e.g. strategic misrepresentation) besides technical issues related to data and forecasting models (Flyvbjerg, 2006) . Further, studies suggest that diverse and competing project cultures and rationalities (van Marrewijk et al., 2008) and the unexpected increase of costs during construction (Merrow, 2003) paired with lack of ex post governing mechanisms to deal with extraordinary and unexpected events (Sanderson, 2012) contribute to poor megaproject delivery. A common issue with megaprojects that often hampers their effective design and delivery and thus positive project performance is that they operate in an environment of uncertainty (project outcomes and probabilities of entry unknown) rather than risk (project outcomes and probabilities of entry known) (Sanderson, 2012) . Research particularly shows a positive relation between the level of technical, social, organizational and environmental complexity and uncertainty (Antoniadis et al., 2011; Bosch-Rekveldt et al., 2011; Giezen, 2012) .
This brings up the question of how megaproject stakeholders -both in general terms and with regard to wind power megaprojects in particular -deal with this uncertainty when making their decisions. In this paper, we focus particularly on investors, whose importance as key stakeholders who provide financial backing without which projects could not exist. In addition, both empirical evidence and the literature show that "investor acceptance" plays a decisive role in determining the success or failure of wind power projects (IEA Wind, 2010 ) and renewable energy innovations in general (e.g. Wüstenhagen et al., 2007) . In the offshore wind power industry, for instance, non-recourse debt financing grew by 40% in 2011 and interest in offshore wind park investments has increased among equity investors (EWEA, 2012b) . But the relatively young age of this industry still creates high risk for investors (specifically, with regard to technology and regulation, e.g. related to grid connection) and makes it more difficult for offshore developers to obtain funding for their projects (Prässler and Schaechtele, 2012) . Increasing investor acceptance of offshore wind power projects is essential in the context of the European clean energy strategy. It would take more than a tenfold increase in capacity from 3.8 GW installed by the end of 2011 (EWEA, 2012b) to o achieve the target of 43 GW offshore wind power by 2020 set by the members of the European Union in course of their National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAP) (European Commission, 2010) .
From a theoretical perspective, investor acceptance can be defined as the decision of financiers to invest in innovative technologies or projects. In the context of wind power, this concept is treated as part of a more comprehensive model of social acceptance as defined by Wüstenhagen et al. in 2007 . The social acceptance model distinguishes between three distinct, yet interdependent dimensions: socio-political acceptance of a new technology (e.g. of the general public or policymakers), community acceptance (e.g. of the community and neighborhoods that are adjacent to infrastructure projects) and market acceptance (e.g. of consumers or investors). As this paper takes an investor acceptance perspective, it interprets the other two dimensions of social acceptance as policy risk (socio-political acceptance) and community acceptance risk, which both relate to the macro environment of a wind power (megaproject) investment. Such macro risk factors, along with other types of risks, which relate to a more technical micro context of a wind power project (e.g. technology risk, completion risk, and market risk), affect investors' risk-return assessment during the decision-making process.
In an investment context, risk is traditionally treated as "objective" (Ganzach, 2000) whereas empirical research shows that a more comprehensive theory of financial risk such as perceived risk, which also considers psychological mechanisms better explains investor behavior (e.g. Ganzach, 2000; Olsen, 2008; Slovic, 1992; Slovic et al., 2004) . Particularly scholars in the field of behavioral finance (e.g. Barberis and Thaler, 2003; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shiller, 2003; Simon, 1955) provide evidence that psychological factors such as status quo bias, frame dependence, loss aversion or overconfidence affect investor behavior. They also show that their influence is specifically prevalent in the context of investment decision-making under uncertainty. Two examples from the offshore wind power industry illustrate the way in which behavioral and social factors might influence investment decision-making: first, that of the London Array offshore wind park, which had to deal with serious increases in cost due to the rising prices of steel and wind turbines before production began, which contributed to Shell's exit from the project in 2008.
[3] Such rotation of key project stakeholders can have negative impact on project performance (Giezen, 2012) but can also alert other investors in the industry to reconsider their investment plans based on this information. The second example is the Hypo-Vereinsbank (HVB), one of the pioneers in project financing. The bank announced that it was setting aside reserves of 710 million euros due to considerable delay in one of its offshore wind parks -thus effectively issuing a warning to other banks that might be entering or planning to enter the offshore wind power industry. [4] The example of the London Array offshore wind park also illustrates that investor acceptance is not static; in other words, even though an investor decides to finance a megaproject, investor acceptance can decrease over time due to different reasons and lead to a withdrawal of capital, and thus potentially induce project instability or failure. Deepening our theoretical understanding of the determining factors in the investment decision-making process under uncertainty and the management of issues related to investor acceptance in the context of very largescale wind power projects thus forms a fruitful gateway to further research. More specifically, this paper seeks to respond to the following two questions:
X How do behavioral and social effects besides macro and micro risk factors in wind power megaproject investments influence investors' risk-return assessment, risk and return perceptions, and thus investor acceptance of wind power megaprojects? X How can wind power megaproject managers positively influence investor acceptance i.e. through which mechanisms and elements?
This paper puts forward a conceptual model of investor acceptance of wind power megaprojects, drawing on insight gleaned from literature on behavioral finance, social acceptance of wind power projects, megaproject management, and stakeholder management. It aims at establishing a theoretical foundation to increase our understanding of investor acceptance and its implications on megaproject management in a wind power context -an approach that could conceivably be further developed as well as empirically verified and validated in future research. Moreover, the findings elaborated here provide insight that should prove beneficial not only to those who manage and/or invest in wind power megaprojects, but also to policymakers, consultants, and other stakeholders.
The paper proceeds as follows: first, the authors explore the concept of investor acceptance in greater depth and further put it in the context of investment decision-making under uncertainty. Next, they introduce a conceptual model of investor acceptance in wind power megaprojects based on insights from the literature review. Lastly, the authors discuss implications of investor acceptance on the management of wind power megaprojects and approaches to influencing and managing investor acceptance.
Theory Investor Acceptance of Renewable Energy Technology
This paper specifically focuses on investors in wind power megaprojects as internal stakeholders who possess the capabilities and resources to highly influence the performance of a project (Atkin and Skitmore, 2008; Cleland, 1995; Lim et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 1997) . Megaproject investors, in this context, are defined as all equity shareholders of a wind power megaproject or project company (special purpose vehicle, SPV), i.e. for instance project sponsors, financial or institutional (e.g. infrastructure funds, private equity funds, pension funds) and strategic (e.g. power companies) investors and other stakeholders that hold an equity stake in a project or SPV such as project developers or technology producers (Sonntag-O'Brian and Usher, 2004; UNEP, 2012) . We additionally include banks and other debt capital providers (e.g. mezzanine capital) into the definition of megaproject investors used in this paper as banks, in particular, typically provide large parts of project finance and are also subject to acceptance issues ("bankability of projects") (Lüdeke-Freund and Loock, 2011) . The actual group of inves-tors differs between projects (see e.g. EWEA, 2012b). The actual megaproject managers also vary between projects and can be project sponsors, project developers, consultants, or other service providers.
In general terms, investor acceptance can be defined as financiers' decisions to invest in innovative technologies or projects. This concept is related to the diffusion of innovations (Rogers, 2003) , i.e. the adoption of innovative goods or services in consumer markets. If investors accept an investment opportunity or adopt a financial product, it means that they are willing to financially engage in a tangible asset (e.g. power generation project) or intangible asset (e.g. bond, stock, etc.) in return for economic gain. Investor acceptance also indicates an investor's decision as to whether or not to exit or disinvest over time.
In the context of wind power, investor acceptance was first introduced as part of a more comprehensive framework of social acceptance (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007) . In a narrower sense, social acceptance of wind power or renewable energy technology in general can be defined as the public support of such technology and routes back to the 1980s (Bosley and Bosley, 1988; Carlman, 1982 Carlman, , 1984 McDaniel, 1983; Thayer, 1988; Wolsink, 1987 Wolsink, , 1988 Wolsink, , 1989 . Since then a large number of scholars have further developed and investigated this concept and its implications in more detail with respect to the impact of landscape issues (e.g. Pasqualetti, 2011a, b, c; Wolsink, 2007a) , the influence of social acceptance on renewable energy diffusion (e.g. Toke et al., 2008; Raven et al., 2008) benefit and risk sharing (e.g. Wolsink, 2007a, b) , and with respect to specific subtypes of renewable energy technology such as offshore wind power (e.g. Firestone and Kempton, 2007; Firestone et al., 2009; Haggett, 2008) .
While studies on the subject of social acceptance specifically build on public, political, and regulatory issues (Carlman, 1984 ), the conceptual model introduced by Wüstenhagen et al. (2007) takes a more holistic approach and integrates three dimensions: (1) socio-political acceptance; (2) community acceptance; and (3) market acceptance (see also Figure 1) . In contrast to previous models, this one specifically references market acceptance in addition to public and poin addition to public and popublic and political elements. Wüstenhagen et al. (2007) also emphasize the interdependence of these dimensions of social acceptance. Specifically important in this context, is the influence of socio-political and community acceptance on investor acceptance. On the one hand, an investor's risk and return assessment is highly influenced by the prevailing renewable energy support scheme, the amount of financial support or the stability of the political framework (Breukers and Wolsink, 2007) . On the other hand, investors are sensitive to community acceptance issues since local resistance has a negative impact on the business case, i.e. it increases costs and extends the project development period (IEA Wind, 2010; Mormann, 2012) . Both of these two risk factors, policy risk and community acceptance risk, complemented by legal and regulatory risk, can be treated as macro risk factors from a project investor's perspective. Further, investors differentiate a number of micro risk factors (e.g. structural risk, technology risk, completion risk) that are directly related to the specific wind power project. In general, wind power megaproject investments share the same risk factors as investments in smaller-scale wind power projects, other renewable energy technology, and general infrastructure (mega)projects. Table 1 summarizes the risk factors that are involved in wind power investments.
Previous research related to investor acceptance of wind power is scarce (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007) . Past studies only focused on the buy side (investor's perspective) rather than both, the buy and the sell (in this case, the project manager's perspective) side. Further, scholars specifically investigated the influence of renewable energy policy frameworks (policy risk) and community acceptance (community acceptance risk) on investors' or project developers' willingness to invest in wind power projects. 
Micro risk factors
Structural risk Structural risk e.g. relates to the structure of the ownership of the project company (special purpose vehicle, SPV), quality of the sponsor and contractual risk sharing between parties.
SAM (2012)
Technology risk Technology risk stems from the innovativeness or ongoing development of the technology used to produce the final output.
Farrell (2003); Fitch Ratings (2011)
Completion risk Completion risk can be defined as the likelihood and the extent to which a project may incur construction delays or cost overruns.
Fitch Ratings (2011)
Operation risk Operation risk mainly relates to a reduction in productivity (due to outages and or failure to meet expected performance standards) or may incur costs that are greater than projected.
Supply risk Supply risk is particularly attributed to the risk that the main input factor (wind) will not be available or not be available as projected.
Farrell (2003); Fitch Ratings (2011)
Market and revenue risk Market risk mainly relates to revenue (return) components and stems from the possibility that the project may lose its competitive position in the output market, e.g. if the national wind power support scheme is changed in a negative manner (e.g. if the feed-in tariff is reduced). 
Investment Decision-Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty
As already shown in the previous subchapter, investors in wind power megaprojects, but also in general, typically decide on their financial engagements through a process of carefully weighting risks and returns. Frameworks and mathematical models have been developed to support investors in their decision-making processes. However, there are two important issues that limit the application of traditional investment decision models in a context of megaprojects in general and specifically with respect to wind power megaprojects: (1) they assume that decisions are made in a context of risk rather than uncertainty; and (2) further consider financial risk as a purely statistical and objective concept without incorporating psychological factors. Traditional investment decision frameworks and models mostly assume conditions of risk, i.e. decisionmakers are able to assign mathematically or statistically derived objective probabilities to a range of known future events or outcomes (Knight, 1921) . However, in the case of megaprojects, due to their high degree of complexity (Giezen, 2012) , investors are often faced with conditions of uncertainty. Literature distinguishes two types of uncertainty: In the first type, decisionmakers know the alternative future events or outcomes but are only able to assign subjective probabilities to them based on "expectations grounded in historical practice" (Sanderson, 2012: 435) . In the second type, the "nature and range of future events or outcomes is unknown and unknowable, not simply hard to predict because of a lack of relevant data" and thus decision-makers are faced with a situation where the future is socially constructed over time with "little or no relation to the past or the present" (ibid.). The underlying assumption of this research paper is that megaproject investors normally treat and manage uncertainties as risks and assign probabilities to a range of future events or outcomes even though this practice might be questionable (Koppenjan et al., 2010; Perminova et al., 2008) . Treating uncertainties as risks or simply ignoring them is even more problematic when investing in megaprojects in the offshore wind power industry. The reasons are an increased technological complexity and lacking past experience and historical data, which might even be exaggerated under specific geographical conditions, such as in the German offshore wind power industry. The German Federal Ministry for the Environment, for instance, emphasizes in this context that "the offshore wind energy usage in Germany with its prevailing requirements related to water depth and distance to coast is a completely new way of wind energy usage" (BMU, 2007: 113) .
Thus, literature suggests, that the higher the degree of context-uncertainty the higher the degree of subjectivity in decision-making related to the particular context. A more comprehensive theory of financial risk that better explains this subjectivity in decision-making under uncertainty, is the concept of perceived risk, which views financial risk as "a multi attribute psychological phenomenon that involves other attributes besides probabilities and outcomes" (Olsen, 2008: 58) . Such other attributes include, for instance, feelings, which are based on emotion and affect (Slovic et al., 2004) . This theory of risk specifically builds on the perspective that risk is "inherently subjective" and that it "does not exist out there, independent of our minds and cultures, waiting to be measured" (Slovic, 1992: 119) .
However, independent of adopting this view of "pure subjectivity" scholars in this field agree that what actually influences human decisions are perceptions of risk and return rather than purely statistical risk and return values (Olsen, 2008) . Ganzach (2000) , for instance, further examined such risk and return judgments in a financial context and distinguished two different models depending on whether the investor is familiar with the financial asset or not. He showed that in case familiarity with financial assets is given, risk and return judgments are generated based on "appropriate ecological information" about risk and return values available through e.g. past experience or summary statistics from financial reports (ibid: 356). In case of unfamiliar assets, both risk and return judgments are derived from global preferences toward the assets. Further, the results of Ganzach's experiments suggest that although the ecological values of risk and return are positively related, perceptions of risk and return are not. The inverse relationship between perceived risk and return, which can be attributed to affect, has also been reported by other authors such as Alhakami and Slovic (1994) , Finucane et al. (2000) , and Finucane and Holup (2006) . Different studies from the behavioral finance literature further show in this context that investors tend to buy assets they are familiar with such as domestic stocks, as they (wrongly) perceive these assets to bear less financial risk (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; French and Poterba, 1991; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Huberman, 2001; Wang et al., 2011) . Several behavioral finance scholars provide empirical evidence of other systematic biases[5] that influence investment decisions under uncertainty as well as risk and return perceptions (e.g. Barberis and Thaler, 2003; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shiller, 2003; Simon, 1955) such as status quo bias, frame dependence, loss aversion or overconfidence.
Besides such cognitive or behavioral biases literature also shows the influence of social effects on investment decision-making and risk perception (e.g. Wang and Johnston, 1995; Wang et al., 2001) . A social phenomenon in financial markets is, for instance, herding, which refers to the behavior that investors are influenced by other investors' decisions. If their investment decision is different than the decision of other investors they alter their initial decision to follow the "crowd" (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001; Froot et al., 1992; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003) . Related mechanisms are also discussed in the science and technology as well as diffusion of innovations literature, such as expectation dynamics (e.g. Wüsten-hagen et al., 2009 ) and peer effects (Rogers, 2003) . Scholars define expectation dynamics as specific (related to a product or project) or general (related to the role of a particular technology in society) expectations about the future (Ruef and Markard, 2010) , which might add momentum or create a hype cycle in an innovation diffusion process accelerating adoption and technological development (Borup et al., 2006) . Peer effects in the diffusion of innovations literature refer to that members of a social system adopt an innovation over time by means of communication through e.g. mass media and, specifically, the interaction between individuals (Rogers, 2003) .
The influence of behavioral and social effects on investment decisions under uncertainty related to renewable energy technology has also been shown by various studies: Hampl et al. (2012) , for instance, reveal that venture capitalists' investments in renewable energy start-ups are strongly influenced by social networks; Chassot et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence suggesting that venture capitalists' underinvestment in renewable energy deals can be explained by a policy aversion bias; Lüdeke-Freund and Loock (2011) show that banks' financing decisions with regard to large-scale photovoltaic projects are prone to a "debt for brands" bias related to the photovoltaic modules that are implemented in the project.
Conceptual model of investor acceptance in wind power megaprojects
Based on insights from our literature review in the previous chapters of this paper, we introduce a conceptual model of investor acceptance in wind power megaprojects in Figure 2 . This model builds on previous work and extends it in two ways: (1) by explicitly distinguish- ing between the influence of behavioral (e.g. status quo bias, overconfidence) and social effects (e.g. peer effects) besides macro and micro risk factors (e.g. policy risk, community acceptance risk, technology risk) on investment decisions in wind power megaprojects; and (2) by illustrating how megaproject managers can positively influence investor acceptance, which will be the explicit subject of the following chapter of this paper.
The conceptual model as depicted in Figure 2 shows that information about actual macro and micro risk factors of the underlying wind power megaproject have a positive relationship to return factors of such projects, i.e. if risks increase, investors demand a risk compensation and thus higher returns on their investment. This information about actual risk and return values further influence investor-specific perceptions about risks and returns related to the project investment (Ganzach, 2000) . In course of this cognitive process of riskreturn assessment several behavioral (e.g. status quo bias, overconfidence) or social (e.g. peer effects) biases or effects might occur, which directly influence risk and return perceptions (e.g. Kahneman, 2003; Olsen, 2008) . Specifically social effects are relevant in the context of wind power megaprojects. The decisions of investors, but also the decisions of other industry players such as EPCs (engineering, procurement and construction contractors) or technology producers, can have a much wider impact that even goes beyond the affected project by acting as references and thus by influencing future investor acceptance of large-scale and complex wind power projects. This is what we, for instance, refer to as "peer effects" in this specific context. The risk and return judgments finally affect an investor's decision whether to invest in a wind power megaproject or not. This whole process of risk-return evaluation and decision-making is regularly updated over time during project implementation, i.e. although if investor acceptance is achieved at a certain stage of the project, this is no guaranty that it will remain stable over time (see, for instance, the London Array case where Shell exited during project implementation).
The conceptual model in Figure 2 further shows which elements of the investment decision-making process megaproject managers can influence in order to increase investor acceptance. More detailed explanations related to these mechanisms and managerial implications are subject of the following chapter.
Managerial Implications
Management of Projects and Stakeholders
The Project Management Institute (PMI)
[6] defines a project as "a temporary group activity designed to produce a unique product, service or result" and thus project management as "the application of knowledge, skills and techniques to execute projects effectively and efficiently". Project management and project management training in a narrower sense is more tactical and execution focused dedicated to optimizing time and cost factors (Eweje, Turner, and Müller, 2012) . But due to their scale, duration, and far-reaching impact, megaprojects additionally require a more strategic management and decisionmaking approach. An important element of strategic project management is the management of stakeholder interests. Stakeholder management in a megaproject context, thus, puts high emphasis on the identification, analysis, and management of key stakeholders and the establishment of effective governance structures (Dunoviţ, 2010; Eweje et al., 2012) .
Stakeholder management is a traditional strategic management instrument routed in stakeholder theory in the context of organizations (Freeman, 1984 ). Transferred from a corporate level to the management of construction projects, Newcombe (2003: 842) defines stakeholders as any "groups or individuals who have a stake in, or expectation of, the project's performance", which includes "clients, project managers, designers, subcontractors, suppliers, funding bodies, users and the community at large". Literature provides different classifications of stakeholders such as according to their involvement in a project (internal versus external stakeholders) (e.g. Freeman, 1984; Gibson, 2000) , their power and legitimacy (Johnson et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 1997; Newcombe, 2003) or their position towards a project (e.g. McElroy and Mills, 2007) . Meeting the expectations of stakeholders over the life cycle of a construction project is mandatory for a successful project delivery as stakeholders can have the power to delay or even stop projects (Atkin and Skitmore, 2008; Cleland, 1995; Lim et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 1997) . Figure 3 gives an overview of typical stakeholders involved in wind power (mega)projects. In megaprojects often more than one firm or individual can be attributed to a stakeholder type. Sometimes one firm or individual takes over multiple stakeholder roles.
Approaches to Influencing and Managing Investor Acceptance
From a megaproject manager's perspective investor acceptance can be influenced over two different routes [7] : (1) indirectly through tactical project management focusing on project performance in terms of time and costs (as project performance has a high impact on investor acceptance); and (2) directly through the active management of investor acceptance as part of stakeholder management and governance. Both approaches are essential in order to achieve high investor acceptance as they target two different elements of the investor acceptance model (see Figure 2) as elaborated in the following paragraphs.
Tactical project management particularly influences the macro and micro risk factors (excluding risks that can only be influenced by other stakeholders and force majeure risks). Some of these risks are also influenced by strategic project management techniques such as external stakeholder management (community acceptance risk). In general, risks are managed through an adequate risk management process that typically comprises the steps of initiation, identification, analysis, planning, monitoring, and control (risk retention, transfer, reduction and avoidance) (e.g. Chapman, 1997; Akintoye and MacLeod, 1997; Perminova et al., 2008) . In order to manage community acceptance risks managers of wind power megaprojects can adopt different benefit and risk sharing models, such as coownership through community funds or power contracting, in order to increase the community acceptance of projects. A more comprehensive model of stakeholder management with the objective to increase social acceptance of renewable energy technology projects is the ESTEEM methodology [8] , which might also be applied to manage investor acceptance issues. How megaproject managers treat and manage such risks, and thus ensure positive project performance, has high influence on an investor's risk-return assessment and thus on investor acceptance. Therefore, this is what we summarize as the indirect influence on investor acceptance.
The investor's perceived risks (and returns) that are for instance influenced by behavioral and social factors such as actions by peers or other industry players, are harder to influence and manage. Typically, the investor acceptance risk (specifically related to exit or disinvestment over the lifecycle of a megaproject) is treated through contractual arrangements. Besides adequate contracts this active investor acceptance management also includes investor relationship management as part of stakeholder management activities and strategic megaproject management (Eweje et al., 2012) . Relationship management should specifically target the perceptions of risks and returns that investors hold with regards to a financial engagement in wind power megaprojects. This can comprise techniques such as active communication, negotiation, or the offering of incentives (Chinyio and Akintoye, 2008) .
The management of investor perceptions is important in both stages of an investment cycle: (1) the pre-contractual phase of opportunity identification and assessment; and (2) the post-contractual phase of investment management (e.g. decision to exit or disinvest). Negative (e.g. no investment interest at all) or decreased investor acceptance over the lifecycle of a project may have negative impact on project performance in terms of time and budget overruns. This active and ongoing management of investor acceptance relates to the common tenor of recent literature in the megaproject management field with regards to megaproject governance. Scholars emphasize the importance of "governing" practices in terms of a dynamic process versus a static establishment of processes and practices in course of the project planning stage ("governance") (Sanderson, 2012) . Figure 4 summarizes the two approaches how to influence and manage investor acceptance.
CONCLUSIONS
The energy industry is undergoing a fundamental transformation, which has been coined a "global energy technology revolution" by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2008) . In search of a sustainable energy supply, governments around the globe have set the goal to grow the supply of energy from renewable sources. As a consequence, there is a need to significantly scale up previous levels of investment in renewable energy. Specifically important in this context, is the financing of wind power as one of the most mature and fastest-growing renewable energy technologies. As the trend in this industry, in both sectors, onshore and offshore, is for very large-scale wind power projects the average project gets more complex in technical, social, organizational and environmental terms and thus more uncertain. In the offshore wind power industry this uncertainty is even higher as this market sector is still in earlier stages of development than the established onshore sector. The question arises how key stakeholders like investors deal with this increased uncertainty inherent to such wind power megaprojects and how megaproject managers can positively influence and manage investor acceptance. In this contribution we introduce a conceptual model of investor acceptance of wind power megaprojects and approaches how to manage investor acceptance based on insights from the literature on behavioral finance, social acceptance of wind power projects, megaproject management and stakeholder management. This conceptual model could be used as a starting point to further investigate the issue of investor acceptance in a wind power megaproject context particularly in course of empirical studies such as case studies or surveys of investors and megaproject managers. Findings will generate valuable insights for managers and investors of wind power megaprojects but also for other stakeholders such as policymakers and consultants. Potentially it will also be possible to draw lessons for other energy sectors (e.g. gas-fired power stations or pipelines, electricity transmission grids) or even across infrastructure sectors (e.g. transportation) that specifically have to deal with investor acceptance issues.
An interesting feature of the offshore wind power market is a shift in the type of investors. While these capital-intensive projects have traditionally be financed by strategic investors such as power companies that are used to build centralized and very large-scale power plants the investor base in such projects is getter more diverse (e.g. pension funds or other financial investors). With new types of investors with differing investment strategies, rationalities, and risk appetites entering the wind power scene analyzing investor acceptance and its management gets even more relevant. Further studies on this issue, both conceptual and empirical ones, might thus specifically focus on differences in risk-return assessment, risk perceptions and return expectations as well as management aspects between these various types of wind power megaproject investors. [5] The question remains whether this deviation from the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1991 ) is a bias to fully rational behavior rather than a facet of rationality in order to deal with the uncertainty in decision-making (e.g. Todd and Gigerenzer, 2003) .
[6] http://www.pmi.org/en/About-Us/About-UsWhat-is-Project-Management.aspx (accessed 27 November 2012).
[7] We particularly focus on "risk" and "risk perceptions" in the following paragraphs, as we assume in our conceptual model a positive relationship between risk and return factors, between risk and perceived risk as well as between return and perceived return factors. 
